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ABSTRACT
Our paradigm for the use of artificial agents to teach requires among other things that they persist through time in their interaction
with human students, in such a way that they “teleport” or “migrate” from an embodiment at one time t to a different embodiment at
later time t'. In this short paper, we report on initial steps toward the formalization of such teleportation, in order to enable an
overseeing AI system to establish, mechanically, and verifiably, that the human students in question will likely believe that the very
same artificial agent has persisted across such times despite the different embodiments. The system achieves this by demonstrating to
the students that different embodiments share one or more privileged beliefs that only one single agent can possess.

Keywords: Adaptive/Personalized Learning, Artificial Intelligence, Mobile Learning

INTRODUCTION
Our paradigm for the use of artificial agents to teach
requires among other things that they persist through
time in their interaction with human students, in such a
way that they “teleport” or “migrate” from an
embodiment at one time, labeled as t, to a different
embodiment at a later time. In this article, we report on
initial steps toward the formalization of such
teleportation, in order to enable an overseeing AI system
(which could be the teaching agent or another
completely different agent) to establish, mechanically,
and verifiably, that the human students will likely
believe that the very same artificial agent has persisted
across such times despite the different embodiments.
The plan for the paper is straightforward, and as
follows. After encapsulating our paradigm for the
deployment of artificial agents in service of learning, and
taking
note
of
the
fact
that
the
“teleportation”/“migration” problem has hitherto been
treated only informally, we convey the kernel of our
approach to formalizing agent teleportation between
different embodiments, then formalize this kernel in
order to produce an initial simulation, and wrap up with
some final remarks.

humans whose education is to be thereby enhanced. The
artificial agents in our paradigm are able to seamlessly
“teleport” between heterogeneous environments in
which a human learner may find herself as time unfolds;
this capacity is intended to provide a continuous
educational experience to the human student, and offers
the possibility of human-machine friendship.
In short, our agents need to be “teleportative.” This
means that the agent should be usable in multiple
hardware environments by a user, such that the user has
the impression of a continuous, uninterrupted interaction
with the very same agent. This helps to reinforce the
possibility of a persistent, trusting relationship between
human and machine. See Figure 1 below for one
implemented incarnation of such a system: TIPPAE
(Teleportative Intelligent Persistent Personalized Agents
for Education). As can be seen in the figure, other than
possibly sharing names, there is no explicit information
that indicates that the same agent persists across the
interactions. Our contribution in this article is aimed at
addressing this issue.

Our Paradigm & Teleportation
A crucial part of our novel paradigm for artificial
agents that teach is the engineering of a class of AIs,
crucially powered by cognitive logics, able to persist
through days and weeks in their interaction with the
Toward Formalizing Teleportation of Pedagogical Artificial Agents: Angel, Govindarajulu, and Bringsjord
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presentation) is any physical or virtual interface for an
agent. A single artificial agent can have multiple
embodiments.
We highlight below the challenge we seek to solve.
Challenge: Given that the same agent a can have
different physical embodiments (m1, … mn), in
different
physical
and
virtual
educational
environments, how do we convince a student u
interacting with agent a, that despite differences in
embodiments, the student u is dealing with the same
agent a?
Briefly, our solution leverages cognition and is
summarized below.
Solution Summary: Since embodiments vary, the
agent a has to convince u that it is the same agent
based on demonstrating to u one or more personal
beliefs about u that all the embodiments, and only the
embodiments of a possess.
Figure 1a. Virtual Embodiment. TIPPAE can interact with
students through a messaging application on their phones.

PRIOR ACCOUNTS OF TELEPORTATION
OF ARTIFICIAL AGENTS

Figure 1b. Physical Embodiment. Here TIPPAE interacts with
the student through a robot. The student can respond to
TIPPAE’s questions by selecting one of the block’s placed in
front of the robot. If the answer is correct, TIPPAE responds
by exuberantly moving around.

Definitions: Some definitions are in order before we
go any further. An agent (or person) is either a human
or any artificial system of sufficient intelligence. Our
usage is not different from standard uses of the word
“agent” in the AI literature (Russell & Norvig
2009). An embodiment (or manifestation, or

There is some excellent and interesting prior work
on teleporting artificial agents. Some explore how the
consistency of a migrating agent’s memory affects a
user’s perception of a continuous identity (Aylett et al.,
2013) and have suggested that migrating the long-term
memories of an agent could have a stronger effect than
migrating short-term memories, something that our
paradigm is uniquely positioned to explore. Others shed
light on visual cues useful for convincing users of an
agent’s teleportation (Koay, Syrdal, Walters, &
Dautenhahn, 2009) by illustrating how cues imply both a
connection between embodiments and the migration of
the agent; a simple example of this could be a bar on the
previous embodiment slowly emptying while a bar on
the next embodiment fills in, to enhance the impression
of teleportation. In addition, progress has been made
toward the design of migrating agents (Hassani & Lee,
2014) and testing real-world implementations of such
agents (Gomes et al., 2011). All of these works help to
explore, flesh out, and define what a teleportative agent
should be; unfortunately for our purposes, the prior art is
informal. Our goal is to capture teleportation formally,
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and on the strength of that formalization to enable an
overseeing AI system to prove, or minimally justify
rigorously, that the teleportation in question is indeed
believable.
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understand beliefs of agents which might themselves be
about beliefs of other agents (and so on).

THE KERNEL OF THE FORMALIZATION
In the longstanding quasi-technical literature on
personal identity in philosophy, there is a strong
tradition of trying to work out a rigorous account of
when person (or agent) p1 at t1 (= pt1 ) is identical with
person (or agent) pt2 on the basis of shared memories
between pt1 and pt2 . More concretely, for our problem,
as mentioned, a given agent or person can have multiple
embodiments across time. The goal here is to determine,
in some rigorous manner, whether two different
embodiments are of the same agent.
Simple schemes such as the embodiment of the
agent sharing the same name or appearance might not
always work. Sharing of names is unreliable since there
might be more than one virtual agent with the same
name. For example, is Apple’s Siri on two different
devices the same agent? The same worry infects any
such proposal as that sharing appearance will settle
matters. Furthermore, sharing appearances might not
always even be possible. For instance, in the example in
Figure 1, the embodiment in the first instance has no
physical representation and in the second instance, a
robot represents the agent.
The above argument demonstrates that we need to
have a deeper model of a virtual agent being the same or
different across different embodiments. The gist of our
scheme, reflective of the line of thinking on personal
identity in philosophy mentioned above, is that the
embodiments can be considered to be the same if they
share certain privileged beliefs. These beliefs are ones
that only a single agent could possibly access.
The goal of our initial formalization here is to build
a system that can find a proof for when it believes that a
student believes two embodied agents are the same pt1 ≡
pt2. The system can conclude that the student believes
two embodiments to be the same if the system can find a
proof that it believes that the student believes that the
two embodiments have a privileged belief β at specific
times that cannot be believed by more than one agent. If
the system fails to find such a proof or argument, then
the system can take corrective actions to make it more
explicit to the human that the embodiments are the same.
Note that formalization requires the system to

Figure 2. A Teaching Agent with Different Embodiments.
When can we guarantee that the student believes that the two
embodiments are of the same agent?

INITIAL FORMALIZATION & SIMULATION
The requirement that the system understand the
student’s beliefs about other embodied agents’ beliefs
implies that we need to have a sufficiently expressive
system. BDI logics (belief/desire/intentions) have a long
tradition of being used to model such agents
(Wooldridge, 2002) with deep beliefs.

Formal system
For our formalization, we use a system that is in the
general tradition of such logics. We specifically use the
formal system DCEC (deontic cognitive event calculus)
used in (Govindarajulu & Bringsjord 2017). DCEC has a
well-defined syntax and inference system; see Appendix
A of (Govindarajulu & Bringsjord, 2017a) for a full
description of the technical details of the system. The
inference system in DCEC is based on natural
deduction (Gentzen, 1935), which is an inference
system commonly used by practicing mathematicians
and by educators in logic.
This calculus itself is a first-order modal logic
(Boolos et al., 2002) and belongs to a family of cognitive
calculi. Cognitive calculi are formal systems designed to
model and automate multiple agents with beliefs,
desires, intentions, and other cognitive states, interacting
over time. Cognitive calculi include the event calculus
(Mueller, 2014), a system for reasoning over the
physical world and commonsense phenomena. More
specifically, DCEC is designed to model ethical
principles. For instance, DCEC has been used previously
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by Govindarajulu and Bringsjord (2017a) to formalize
and automate versions of the doctrine of double effect,
an ethical principle with deontological and
consequentialist components. Cognitive calculi have also
been used to formalize and automate highly cognitive
reasoning processes, such as the false-belief task
(Arkoudas and Bringsjord, 2008) and akrasia
(succumbing to temptation to violate moral principles)
(Bringsjord et al., 2014). Arkoudas and Bringsjord
(2008) introduced the general family of cognitive event
calculi to which DCEC belongs, through their
formalization of the false-belief task. While describing
the calculus is beyond the scope of this article, we give
an example representation of a complex belief
represented in the calculus in Table 1. The logical
operator “B” below represents a belief.
Although it is possible to install YOURLS as a
subdirectory on a website, it is counterintuitive if the
goal is to shorten URLs. The reason being, is that an
additional subdirectory will create a longer URL. For
example,
if
a
site’s
domain
is
“www.domain.edu/YOURLS,” the link will be much
more to input into a device.
Table 1. Example representation of information in DCEC
(deontic cognitive event calculus).

Language

Representation

English
statement

John believes now that Mary
believes that it is raining now.

DCEC
Representation

B(john,now, B(mary, now,
holds(raining, now)))

Simulation
The simulation is set up as a reasoning problem from
a set of given assumptions to a goal (see Figure 4). In the
formalization shown below in Figure 4, the system
believes that the student believes two embodiments to
have the same identity if the embodiments at different
times believe some personal object of the student to
have the same property (Assumption A4 in Figure 4).
For instance, assume that the student’s watch is a
personal object. At time t1, we have embodiment a
believing that the watch is stopped, and at time t2 we
also have embodiment b believing the same. From these
assumptions, the system can derive that the student
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believes that the embodiments are the same. See Figure
3 for an example.

Figure 3. Teleportation via Shared Beliefs. The teaching
system knows that the student believes that two different
teaching agents a and b both have a belief that the student’s
watch is stopped. The student believes that if two agents share
a belief about a personal object, then the agents are the same.
From this, the teaching system can conclude that the student
concludes that a and b are in fact the same agent.

Reasoning in the system is performed through the
first-order modal-logic theorem prover, ShadowProver,
which uses a technique called shadowing to achieve
speed without sacrificing consistency in the system
(Govindarajulu & Bringsjord, 2017a). Figure 3 shows
input presented to ShadowProver.

Figure 2. Machine Representation of the Teaching System’s
Beliefs. The above figure shows input to our reasoning system
capturing the state of the teaching agent in the previous figure.

Figure 4 has input to the reasoner describing the
situation in Figure 3. The assumptions and the goal that
are given to the reasoner are explained in English below:
1. A1: The human sees at time t1 that embodiment a
believes at time t1 that the watch has stopped.
2. A2: The human sees at time t2 that embodiment b
believes at time t2 that the watch has stopped.
3. A3: The human believes that the watch is a personal
object.
4. A4: The human believes that if two embodiments
believe the same thing about a personal object at two
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different times, then the two embodiments are of the
same agent.
5. Goal: Finally, the human reasons that embodiment a
and embodiment b are of the same agent.
Note that the above reasoning takes place in the
mind of the TIPPAE agent. If the agent can successfully
prove the above goal from a set of assumptions that it
has access to, then it can conclude that the human
believes that its two different embodiments are of the
same agent.

TIPPAE Revisited with Shared Beliefs across
Embodiments
How might the example scenario we showed in
Figure 1 with TIPPAE be changed to accommodate the
formal model presented above? In at least two
interactions, TIPPAE needs to convey to the student that
it believes one or more things about the student that no
other agent can believe. Trivially, it can be the student’s
state of progress in the domain being taught. The agent
can also remember particular issues that the student
might be facing in the learning task. For some teaching
problems, such as the math problem shown in Figure 1,
it might be easier to identify such beliefs and attributes
than in other teaching problems. Unrelated to the
learning task, as shown in the simulation above in Figure
3, the belief can be about an event or object not related
to the learning task at hand. Somewhat relatedly, in the
domain of user profiling (for example as in Middleton et
al., 2004), statistical information about users is gathered
en masse. User profiling systems, in general, do not
make use of individual pieces of information about users
(though such information might be gathered). While user
profiling systems could help in making TIPPAE even
more personalized to start with, TIPPAE would need to
gather specific beliefs about an individual student and
demonstrate to the student that TIPPAE has those
beliefs.

ETHICAL AND PRIVACY ISSUES
One obvious issue is the privacy of the student when
a teleportative agent seeks to learn some information that
is unrelated to the learning task (as shown in the
simulation above). This can be handled by regimenting
the agent, by forbidding it from acquiring any
information about the student that is not public. A rough
sketch of such a condition cast in the language of DCEC
is shown below in Table 2. The “F” operator in the

example below represents that it is forbidden to do
something. The “B” operator stands for belief as before.
Table 2. Representing a privacy condition in DCEC. Note that
the above condition is just a rough sketch.

Language

Representation

English
statement

TIPPAE is forbidden to believe any
nonpublic information about the
student

DCEC
Representation

F(B(tippae, info)) ∧ belongs(info,
student) ∧ ¬B(public,info)

CONCLUDING REMARKS & NEXT STEPS
We readily admit to having only taken initial steps
toward the formalization of teleportation for artificial
agents. The simulation we have presented does seem to
indicate to us that things are scalable — but of course
only time and experimentation will tell. Finally, it’s
important to note that we haven’t herein sought to
address the educational efficacy of our approach, nor the
specific learning value of persistent teaching agents
across embodiments.
Several possible venues of research exist in this
direction. Vertical studies will focus on a student
progressing through a sequence of increasingly harder
topics in a class or subject (e.g. a sequence of topics T1,
T2, …, in trigonometry). Horizontal studies will focus on
a student learning and applying a topic in one or more
subjects (a student learning a topic T in trigonometry and
applying T in a physics class). Finally, TIPPAE and its
use in a group context, such as helping different
members of a study group based on how advanced they
are, and taking into account their interactions with
others, is another rich area of research that can be
explored. For instance, if a TIPPAE agent knows that a
student s1 has difficulty with topic T but another student
s2 has mastered it, the agent can suggest s1 seek help on
T from s2.
While ethical and privacy concerns exist, the
strength of the underlying formal system in modeling
complex principles can possibly help us address these
concerns. Particularly, DCEC has been used to model
the doctrine of double effect, a principle that is used by
(both formally ethically trained and untrained) humans
to handle a number of longstanding moral dilemmas
(Govindarajulu & Bringsjord 2017a). DCEC has also
been used to model other ethical theories and principles.
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We believe that any significant ethical or privacy
concerns that might have to be handled by the TIPPAE
agent itself, can be handled by the ethical principles that
have already been modeled in DCEC.
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